Welcome back you amazing nerds. It’s been a while since I’ve presented you with a new text on philosophy, but that is because we have now started exploring more structured philosophical theories and ideas. It also means we are gradually getting into more interesting and influential theories and ideas! So, it has taken me longer to organise the many parts in a logical and accessible way, but now it’s time we pick where we left. In the previous text on philosophy, I examined who Plato was and some key events in his life. Now we will start looking at Plato’s most influential ideas in the context of the dialogues they are presented in. Without further delay let’s delve into Plato’s Theory of Ideas.
This theory of Ideas, or Forms as Plato also calls them (Kenny, 2010), is presented across several dialogues – starting with the Euthyphro or the Phaedo depending on your source – and being further alluded to, argued, properly stated and established in some of the other Plato’s dialogues onwards (Adamson, 2014; Kenny, 2010). It’s exactly because it is so prevalent throughout his work that I’m starting my exploration of Plato’s philosophical theories with the Theory of Ideas – it forms a central doctrine that Plato uses as a base for his epistemology and metaphysics, more specifically, how he understands causal relationships (Adamson, 2014).
As a starting point, it’s important to understand that Plato’s philosophy was greatly influenced, beyond obviously his mentor Socrates, by both Heraclitus and Parmenides (Kenny, 2010; Russell, 1946). If you don’t know who these names are by now, you can learn more about them here. But, in a nutshell, Heraclitus believed that everything in our reality is always changing in a constant flux, and Parmenides that reality is an eternal constant with any change being just an illusion (Adamson, 2014; Kenny, 2010; Russell, 1946). Plato’s Theory of Ideas can be seen as a way of Plato trying to combine these two opposing doctrines by dividing our reality into two, the perceptible universe of the senses given to Heraclitus, and the intelligible world of Ideas given to Parmenides (Kenny, 2010).
But what are these Ideas you are asking? As Plato explains in the last book of the Republic, whenever we use a common name for something, for example ‘book’, that something also has an associated ‘Idea’ or ‘Form’. But, although many books exist, there is only a single Idea/Form of book (Russell, 1946). Imagine that Jotaro, Guts and Jack Frost all have a book (if you don’t know these names go read JoJo’s Bizarre Adventure, Berserk, and play Shin Megami Tensei respectively. Then come back as the cultured person you should be). The object they each have has in common that they are all a book. If we say ‘Jotaro likes the story of the book’ we may ask if the word ‘book’ stands for something in the same manner that the name ‘Jotaro’ stands for the individual person Jotaro. And if this is the case, what is this something it stands for? Is it the same something as the word ‘book’ in the sentence ‘Guts takes his book wherever he goes’? It is to answer this type of question that Plato comes up with the theory of Ideas, in this case the Idea of Book: that which makes all individual books a book, the ‘book’-iest book of all books (Kenny, 2010).
Whenever we use a common name or predicate that is applicable to various objects or individuals, according to Plato, this is because all these objects or individuals are related to a certain Idea or Form: they can all either resemble it or share in that form (Kenny, 2010). The books we see are books because they all share or participate in the Idea of Book, but this is only an imperfect resemblance. These books will also have some different characteristics between them: different sizes, different colours, different fonts, one may have a picture on the cover while the other has a drawing, or no picture at all; because these characteristics are not similar between them, it means they also differ from the Idea of Book (Adamson, 2014). According to Plato, this is because in the same way that a picture of a bed only has the appearance of a bed and is not a real bed, so the many individual books are unreal, being copies of the ‘Idea of Book’, the one real book (Russel, 1946). This relationship is also true for predicates applicable to individuals. A person is considered beautiful or just because they participate in the Idea of Beauty or Idea of Justice respectively. And more than one person can be just, or more than one animal can be beautiful, because they will share in the Idea of Justice on the former and the Idea of Beauty for the latter (Adamson, 2014). However, both in these cases, and the prior case of books, the Idea of Book, Beauty and Justice themselves must be separate entities from the individuals that share in them. Even if we compare two of the most beautiful beings, they will have differences between them, some elements thar are not as beautiful, or more beautiful in one being than another – this is because their beauty or justice are only copies of the more real Idea of Beauty or Idea of Justice (Adamson, 2014).
Besides this general explanation, there are a few principles that Plato theorizes the Ideas all follow, to explain which I will be using the hypothetical characteristic “T” and “Idea of T”:
The Principle of Commonality – When several things present with or are T, this is because they participate the singular Idea of T. For example, all things purple have in common the property of being purple. There must only be one single Idea of Purple, otherwise we can’t explain why purple things all share this in common (Kenny, 2010).
The Principle of Separation – The Idea of T is a separate entity from all the things that are or present T (Kenny, 2010).
The Principle of Self-Predication – The Idea of T is itself T. An important principle for Plato, as it is needed to show how the forms explain causality. For example, only what is cold can make something cold, so the Idea of Cold must itself be cold (Kenny, 2010).
The Principle of Purity – The Idea of T is not only T, but it is the perfect example of what it is to be or have T. It does not possess any other properties, as that would mean it would be inferior to some other Idea (we’ll see below there is a single exception to this) (Kenny, 2010).
The Principle of Uniqueness – Nothing but the Idea of T is really, truly T. The other objects and beings who present a characteristic are only sharing it in an imperfect way as mentioned above (Kenny, 2010).
The Principle of Sublimity – Ideas are eternal, they have no parts, do not change and are not perceptible to the senses (Kenny, 2010).
This last principle in particular links to Plato’s thesis that the Ideas are more real than the objects or characteristics of individuals we see and experience in our daily lives. This leads us to the role the Ideas take in Plato’s metaphysics and previously mentioned influence of, and moderation between, the influences of Parmenides and Heraclitus. Plato argues that the Ideas or Forms exist in an eternal world that never changes like the ‘Being’ of Parmenides. The beings and objects that are present in our empirical world of the senses, on the other hand, are in a constant change between being and non-being, similar to Heraclitus’ flux (Kenny, 2010). As it is eternal, Plato considers the unchanging world of Ideas superior, more real and truer, compared to the changing world of experience (Kenny, 2010). With this we can also link the Ideas to Plato’s epistemology. As the Ideas, and their world, are truer and more real, they work as the ultimate standard of comparison for us to know if a thing, object or being has a certain characteristic in themselves, their actions or behaviour. Thus, they end up having an important role in how we obtain or create knowledge (Adamson, 2014). And according to Plato, a philosopher is a lover of truth and knowledge, so understanding the forms will be crucial to be one (Kenny, 2010).
To help further explain the relationship between the Ideas, knowledge and what a philosopher ought to be, Plato distinguishes the philosopher as a lover of truth and knowledge from the common person, who is more interested in aspects of sense-perception such as sights and sounds (Kenny, 2010). This leads to the common person not knowing, for example, the difference between someone just and justice itself. They confuse a copy or image for reality, effectively living in an illusion (Kenny, 2010).
Thus, the common person’s understanding of reality is based on thoughts or beliefs (doxa), which contrasts with the knowledge (noesis) the philosopher bases his understanding of reality on (Kenny, 2010).
Plato further elaborates by comparing knowledge to sight. He gives the example that both hearing and seeing are powers, which are distinguished by their objects – hearing is the power for audible things and sight the power for visible things (Adamson, 2014). In the same line of reasoning, knowledge (noesis) is the power for things that are, belief (doxa) is the power for things that both are and are not, and ignorance the power for things that are not (Adamson, 2014; Kenny, 2010). However, sight has the particularity of requiring not only the eye and the object of sight, but also light (Russell, 1946). When the sun is shining, we see objects clearly, when we are in the twilight of the sunset we see things with less clarity, and when in complete darkness we can’t see anything at all. Seeing the world of Ideas would be the equivalent to seeing reality in the same way as when an object is illuminated by the sun, contrasting with the every-day changing world of sense perception we live in, which is equated to seeing an object in the twilight (Russell, 1946).
By now you may be asking what in this case would be the equivalent to the eye and the sun or the light that illuminates, when we talk about the objects of knowledge and belief. In this case the eye is compared to the soul, and the sun would be that which Plato affirms to contain in it truth and goodness: the Idea of Good (Adamson, 2014; Russel, 1946). Thus is the standard through which the philosopher can attain knowledge, as without knowing the essence of goodness and truth through knowledge of the Idea of Good, the philosopher will not understand what is true and good about the other Ideas (Adamson, 2014).
This analogy of knowledge as the power to see the things that truly are, through the soul, as illuminated by the Idea of Good ultimately leads to one of the most famous elements of Plato’s philosophy: the allegory of the cave (Russel, 1946). But this text has already run somewhat long, and I gave you quite a bit to reflect on. And by keeping you in suspense about this said cave will make you more likely to read the next text – got to keep things interesting eheheh.
Join me in the next text, when we delve into this cave and learn more about how Plato’s theory of Ideas influenced some of our present views of the world.
I hope to see you amazing nerds there,
The Physiolosopher
References:
Adamson, P. 2014. Classical Philosophy: A history of philosophy without any gaps, Volume 1. 1st edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Kenny, A. 2010. A New History of Western Philosophy: In Four Parts. Reprint Edition. Oxford University Press: Oxford.
Russell, B. 1946. History of Western Philosophy. Routledge – Taylor and Francis Group: New York.
The Physiolosopher 
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